This week's wartime "pause" between the United States and Iran reflects reassessment, not reconciliation - but Washington has reason to be optimistic about a swift end to the war.

For the first time in nearly two weeks, American aircraft are not striking Iranian targets around the Strait of Hormuz. Iran, for its part, has refrained from directly retaliating against the United States. 

Both sides seem to be taking a big breath.

Oil prices have fallen, regional governments are working the telephones and President Donald Trump says Washington and Tehran are engaged in “very deep talks.”

It is encouraging. But it should not be confused with peace.

The shooting has paused because both sides are reassessing — not because either side has accepted the other’s terms.

The United States still insists that commercial ships must be able to pass freely through the Strait of Hormuz without submitting to arbitrary Iranian control or paying Tehran for the privilege. Iran still claims the right to supervise traffic through the strait and insists it has not asked Washington to resume negotiations. The wider disagreements over Iran’s nuclear program, missile production, sanctions and regional proxies remain unresolved.

Nevertheless, a pause can be valuable even when it rests on disagreement. Wars do not usually end because one side suddenly embraces the other’s position. They end when the costs, risks and opportunities have changed enough to make compromise preferable to continued fighting.

That moment may now be approaching.

Trump says he halted planned strikes after Oman and other regional governments urged him to give negotiations another chance. His language has been characteristically blunt: If the talks fail, the United States will return to “very strong military action.” He also says he is unwilling to wait long. “Either it goes fast or not at all,” he told Axios.

That is not an unconditional ceasefire. It is a test.

The United States is testing whether military pressure has persuaded Iran to make practical concessions. Iran is testing whether control over the Strait of Hormuz can be converted into economic relief, international recognition or some limited maritime authority. Regional governments are testing whether they can construct a face-saving arrangement before another round of attacks threatens their oil facilities, ports and cities.

The encouraging part is that the immediate dispute may be more manageable than the larger conflict.

The negotiations led by Oman appear focused mainly on maritime navigation. One proposal would permit Iran, Oman and possibly other regional governments to collect reasonable fees for actual services such as navigation assistance, maritime security or environmental protection. The money might be placed in a jointly administered fund with international oversight.

That formulation could give Iran something it can describe domestically as recognition of its regional role without allowing it to impose a political toll on one of the world’s most important waterways. The United States, meanwhile, could preserve the essential principle that lawful commercial traffic cannot be stopped, inspected or charged at Iran’s discretion.

Such an agreement would not solve every problem between Washington and Tehran. It could, however, remove the issue most likely to trigger an immediate return to war.

The economic reaction illustrates how much could be gained. Oil prices fell sharply after the strikes stopped, with Brent crude dropping below $89 a barrel. Shipping through Hormuz remains severely restricted, but markets clearly believe even a temporary reduction in hostilities improves the odds that energy traffic will normalize.

That gives nearly every government involved a reason to push for speed.

The Gulf states want their infrastructure protected. European and Asian countries want reliable energy supplies. Oman wants to prevent a conflict on its doorstep. Iran needs economic breathing room. The United States wants freedom of navigation without becoming trapped in an open-ended bombing campaign.

Washington also enters these negotiations with considerable leverage. The United States has demonstrated that it can strike Iranian targets repeatedly and at scale. Additional military plans have already been prepared. Trump’s decision to pause therefore does not look like an inability to continue; it looks like a deliberate choice to see whether continued force is necessary.

Iran cannot safely assume the pause will last indefinitely.

At the same time, the United States has an interest in avoiding military action for its own sake. Bombing is a tool, not a policy. Once the most valuable targets have been hit, additional attacks may produce diminishing strategic returns while consuming expensive munitions and increasing the danger to American personnel and regional allies. Senior military advisers reportedly raised precisely those concerns before the latest pause.

Allowing diplomacy a brief opportunity is therefore not weakness. It is the logical next step after force has altered the negotiating environment.

The greatest obstacle may be the gap between what each government can accept privately and what it can admit publicly. Iran’s leaders do not want to appear to have requested negotiations under American bombardment. Trump does not want to appear to have accepted Iranian control of Hormuz. Both governments need language that allows them to declare that they defended their fundamental interests.

Oman’s role is especially important because it can carry proposals between the parties without requiring either side to stage an immediate public reconciliation.

Trump’s meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will add another layer. Israel will want assurances that a maritime arrangement does not allow Iran to reopen Hormuz while quietly rebuilding its nuclear and missile capabilities. Netanyahu has made clear that Iran will be the central subject of the meeting.

That concern is justified. A Hormuz agreement should be treated as the beginning of a larger process, not its completion.

Still, the immediate opportunity is real. The demands on the table are difficult, but they are not incomprehensible. Ships must move. Iran needs an off-ramp. Regional governments need stability. The United States has both military superiority and diplomatic support.

Neither side has surrendered its position. Neither side trusts the other. Yet both have chosen, at least temporarily, to stop firing and listen to intermediaries.

That is not peace. But it may be how peace — or at least a workable settlement — begins.

(Contributing writer, Brooke Bell)